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Scout’s Honor: The Boy Scouts, Judicial Ethics, and
the Appearance of Partiality
In January 2015, the California Supreme Court officially
adopted an amendment to its Code of Judicial Ethics with the
express purpose of forbidding judges from remaining members of
the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). 1 Starting on January 21, 2016,
judges in California will no longer be permitted to hold membership
in the Boy Scouts of America 2 or other youth organizations that limit
membership on the basis of “race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.” 3 Although California is the
only state to take affirmative steps to ban membership in the Boy
Scouts, forty-seven states have judicial codes of ethics that ban
judges from membership in groups that practice invidious
discrimination. Twenty-two of those states include in that bar groups
that engage in “invidious discrimination” on the basis of sexual

1. As will be discussed further, the proposed amendment expressly referenced the Boy
Scouts as its intended target. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS, INVITATION TO COMMENT: SP14-02, at 2, 4 (Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter
INVITATION TO COMMENT], http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SP14-02.pdf (“The Bar
Association of San Francisco initiated the request, joined by the Santa Clara County Bar
Association.”). Moreover, the amendment eliminated an exemption, which had been in place
since 1996 allowing for membership in non-profit youth organizations without regard to their
discriminatory practices. See infra Section I.A.
2. The BSA recently changed its policies to allow individual scout troops to decide
whether or not to allow gay scout leaders. As discussed infra in Section I.B, it is not clear
whether the California ban will continue to apply to the BSA. However, in some ways, the
changes in the BSA policy make the discussion of the constitutionality of California’s ban even
more relevant. The policy change came as a result of continued legal challenges such as
California’s pending ban. That unconstitutional efforts such as the judicial ban in California
were successful in pressuring the BSA to change its policies means that such efforts deserve
greater scrutiny. Because these efforts were successful in pressuring the BSA, there is reason to
believe that they may be subsequently implemented against other unpopular groups
and causes.
3. Associated Press, California Bars Judges from Belonging to Boy Scouts, FOX NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/01/24/california-bars-judges-fromboy-scouts/; Mark Pulliam, Blacklisting the Boy Scouts, CITY J. (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.city-journal.org/2015/cjc0206mp.html. See generally INVITATION TO
COMMENT, supra note 1.

ORTNER.FINORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/21/2016 10:50 AM

2015

orientation. 4 Such canons raise significant constitutional concerns
which have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. 5
This Comment will consider the constitutionality of California’s
new ban on judicial participation in the Boy Scouts (“Boy Scout
ban”). Because most states, including California, model their judicial
codes of ethics after the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, these
observations will apply with equal force to other states that have bans
on judicial membership in groups that engage in discrimination that
is deemed invidious. Part I will examine the text and history of the
California Judicial Code of Ethics to show that the State has
deliberately targeted the Scouts and other expressive associations.
Part II will examine the wide range of constitutional rights that are
substantially burdened by the canon, including freedom of
association, free exercise, and parental autonomy. As a result, the
proper standard of review is strict scrutiny, even though judges are
public officials, and the State must justify the restriction by pointing

4. It is unclear whether the policies in these states would ban membership in the
Scouts. As will be discussed in Section I.A, the commentary to the California rule explains that
determining whether a group practices invidious discrimination is a fact-specific, case-by-case
inquiry. California, however, in its request for comment regarding the elimination of the
exemption for youth organizations, expressly stated that this change would impact the Boy
Scouts. See INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Sean Grindlay wrote an invaluable article regarding the change in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct to include sexual orientation. Since his article was published in 2007, there
has been a sea change in the way that society views sexual orientation discrimination, as well as
significant developments in the campaign finance realm, which I rely on heavily in this article.
In addition, Grindlay’s article did not examine other rights that the canon might burden, such
as free exercise or parental rights, nor did he closely examine whether avoiding an appearance
of impartiality could ever constitute a compelling state interest. See generally Sean V. Grindlay,
May a Judge Be a Scoutmaster? Dale, White, and the New Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 5
AVE MARIA L. REV. 555 (2007). Harvard Professor Noah Feldman has also been a prominent
public voice on the topic and has been interviewed in scores of articles relating to the Scout
ban. I am grateful to Professor Feldman for his extensive contribution to the public discourse
over that ban. See Emily Green, California Judges Must Cut Ties with the Boy Scouts, NPR
(Mar. 186, 2015, 2:52 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/16/392360308/californiajudges-must-cut-ties-with-the-boy-scouts; Noah Feldman, Why Can’t California Judges Join
the Boy Scouts?, TAMPA TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.tbo.com/list/news-opinioncommentary/why-cant-california-judges-join-the-boy-scouts-20150131/;
John
Blosser,
Orwellian: California Bars Judges from Joining Boy Scouts, NEWSMAX (Mar. 18, 2015, 6:43
PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/US/Boy-Scouts-judges-California/2015/03/18/
id/631012/.
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to a compelling interest and employ the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. 6
To justify its restriction, the California Supreme Court opines
that membership in a group such as the Boy Scouts, which in the
Court’s view engages in invidious discrimination, creates an
appearance of partiality and bias. 7 It suggests that gays and lesbians
standing before a judge who is a member of the Scouts will have
reason to believe the judge cannot fairly administer justice, and that
the general public will lose confidence in the integrity and objectivity
of the judiciary. 8
However, as Part III will show, avoiding a generalized
appearance of impropriety cannot be a compelling governmental
interest: Specifically, drawing on recent Supreme Court cases in the
realm of campaign finance, Part III will argue that avoiding a
generalized appearance bias (as opposed to the appearance of specific
bias against an actual party before the court) does not rise to the
level of a compelling interest. 9 Moreover, Part IV will argue that the
California policy is poorly tailored to achieve the State’s interest
because it is both grossly over- and underinclusive, and relies on a
cynical view of the judiciary which undermines the State’s purported
interest in public confidence in the system. Additionally, a wide
variety of less restrictive alternatives exist.
As a result of these deficiencies, California’s Scout ban is
unconstitutional
and
should
be
vigorously
challenged
and overturned.
I. THE CALIFORNIA RULE DELIBERATELY TARGETS EXPRESSIVE
ASSOCIATIONS SUCH AS THE BOY SCOUTS
Although seemingly a modest change, the new
the California Code of Judicial Ethics represents a
that the State has a sufficiently compelling interest
membership in any organization (even an expressive
the basis of discriminatory policies.

6.
7.
8.
9.

amendment to
sweeping view
to ban judicial
association) on

See infra Section II.D.
See INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
See infra Section III.A.
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A. The History and Text of the Ban Show that It Was Intended to
Target Expressive Associations Such as the Boy Scouts
California’s Judicial Canon 4 speaks to extrajudicial activities of
judges. Canon 4(c) states that as a general principle, “a judge may
serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of an
educational, religious, charitable, service, or civic organization not
conducted for profit.” 10 Indeed, the commentary to Canon 4A
emphasizes that “[c]omplete separation of a judge from extrajudicial
activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become
isolated from the community in which he or she lives.” 11 Yet Canon
4A emphasizes that judges should not engage in extra-judicial
activities that “(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to
act impartially, (2) demean the judicial office, (3) interfere with the
proper performance of judicial duties, or (4) lead to frequent
disqualification of the judge.” 12 The commentary emphasizes that
“[e]xpressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the
judge’s judicial activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s
capacity to act impartially as a judge.” 13
Judicial Canon 2 prohibits judges from engaging in particular
activities that create impropriety or the appearance of impropriety. 14
It is modeled after the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which in
2007 added a prohibition on membership in groups that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 15 Canon 2(c) bars
judicial “membership in any organization that practices invidious

10. CAL.
CODE
OF
JUDICIAL
ETHICS
Canon
4C(3)(b)
(2015),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf.
11. Id. Canon 4A cmt.
12. Id. Canon 4A.
13. Id. Canon 4A cmt.
14. Id. Canon 2.
15. See ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, REPORT 6 (Nov. 2006), http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/code-of-judicialconduct/aba-joint-comm-report-nov-2006.pdf. There is reason to believe that this change was
in part intended to specifically impact membership in the Boy Scouts. The ABA filed an amicus
brief in the Boy Scouts v. Dale case arguing against allowing the Boy Scouts to continue to
exclude gay members and has been very active in its opposition to the Scouts. See Grindlay,
supra note 5, at 563. For more on the history of the ban on membership in organizations that
practice invidious discrimination, see Natasha A. Phillips, The Belle Meade Example:
Enforcement of Canon 2C Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 733, 735 (2012).
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discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.” 16 The advisory committee
notes explain that this prohibition is necessary “to preserve the
fairness, impartiality, independence, and honor of the judiciary, to
treat all parties equally under the law, and to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety.” The canon once contained an
exemption for “an official military organization of the United
States,” and “a nonprofit youth organization.” 17 The Canon still
retains an exemption for “membership in a religious organization.” 18
And the prior commentary justified the exemption for membership
in youth organizations on the ground that such an exemption was
necessary “to accommodate individual rights of intimate association
and free expression.” 19 For reasons discussed in Part II, such an
accommodation was and remains necessary under the reasoning of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale.
With regards to determining “[w]hether an organization
practices invidious discrimination,” the most recent commentary
notes that this “is often a complex question to which judges should
be sensitive,” and if a group is “dedicated to the preservation of
religious, ethnic, or cultural values of legitimate common interest to
its members” or is an “an intimate, purely private organization,” the
canon may not apply. 20 However, that commentary also makes clear
that other organizations that “arbitrarily exclude[] from
membership” on the basis of one of the aforementioned
classifications can be said to discriminate invidiously. 21 In addition,
the comment suggests that membership in any organization that
engages in illegal discriminatory practices is also forbidden even if
the exclusion is not based on a specified protected class such as race,
gender, or sexual orientation. 22 According to the comment, any
“public manifestation” of a “knowing approval of invidious

16. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2 (2015), http://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf.
17. Id. The military organization exception was once necessary because of policies such
as Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.
18. Id.
19. Id. Canon 2 cmt.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
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discrimination” “gives the appearance of impropriety . . . and
diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.” 23
While the reference to groups “dedicated to the preservation of
religious, ethnic, or cultural values” might at first glance seem to
refer to expressive associations such as the Boy Scouts, it is clear that
the change is intended expressly to foreclose membership in the Boy
Scouts: The invitation to comment expressly stated that eliminating
the exception would have the effect of “prohibiting judges from
being members of or playing a leadership role in the BSA.” 24 Public
comments on the change overwhelmingly focused on the Boy Scouts
and the impact this change would have on judicial Boy Scout
membership. 25 Indeed, several of those commenting on the proposed
changes expressed concern that the BSA was singled out for
attention while other youth groups that might have selective
membership policies such as the Girl Scouts were ignored. 26 Thus, it
seems clear that the California change was expressly meant to apply
to the Boy Scouts.
Moreover, by deleting the sentence in the commentary to Canon
2C regarding the need “to accommodate individual rights of
intimate association and free expression,” the California Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on the Code of Judicial Ethics made it
clear that “the code prohibits judges from being associated with any
organization if that association would affect the integrity or
impartiality of the judiciary.” 27 In so stating, the advisory committee
is implying that the State’s interest in “public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary” trumps or outweighs the right to
belong to even an organization such as the Boy Scouts, which has
been designated as an expressive association by the Supreme Court. 28
23.
24.
25.

Id.
INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1.
SP14-02: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CANON 2C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS [hereinafter AMENDMENT COMMENTARY], http://www.dailyjournal.com/
DJEditorialAttachment/SP14-02_Chart_05_08_14_Final_w_attachments.pdf.
26. See id. cmt. 43 at 295–302 (Jeffrey S. Bostwick, Comment on SP14-02:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CANON 2C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS); see also id. cmt.
354 at 350–52 (Life Legal Defense Fund, Comment on SP14-02: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO CANON 2C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS).
27. INVITATION TO COMMENT, supra note 1.
28. See infra Section II.A.
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Therefore, even though the amendment at first glance seems limited
to the Boy Scouts and perhaps a narrow range of other youth
organizations, it actually represents a sweeping assertion by the State
that it can bar membership in any organization (except perhaps a
religious organization) on the basis of discriminatory policies. 29
Although California is the only state to eliminate an existing
exemption, the code of conduct of many other states would also
arguably prohibit a judge from membership in the Boy Scouts and
other expressive associations. Indeed, the codes of other states are
perhaps even more explicit on this point. For instance, commentary
to the Massachusetts Code of Judicial Conduct is almost identical to
California’s, with this addition: “The purpose of this Rule is to
prohibit judges from joining organizations practicing invidious
discrimination, whether or not their an organization’s membership
practices are constitutionally protected.” 30 Some states likewise lack
even an express exemption for membership in religious
organizations. 31 Thus, it seems clear that several states either believe
that restricting judicial membership in groups such as the Boy Scouts
does not generate serious constitutional problems or that they have a
sufficiently compelling interest to restrict judicial membership. Thus,
although California is the only state to expressly focus on the Boy
Scouts, it is likely that as discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation becomes more and more strongly prohibited throughout
the country, more states will make express efforts to prohibit judicial
membership in the Boy Scouts and other groups with traditional
moral views about homosexuality. Unfortunately, as the next part

29. This is in contrast to the approach taken in New York, where there is an express
exemption for “membership in an organization that is dedicated to the preservation of
religious, ethnic, cultural or other values of legitimate common interest to its members.” N.Y.
RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE § 100.2 (2010), http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/
chiefadmin/100.shtml. While the California rules suggest that such an organization might not
be considered one that engages in invidious discrimination, there is no express exemption.
30. MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT r. 3:09: CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3
r. 3.6 cmt. [2] (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/rules-of-court/sjc/
sjc309.html.
31. See CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 r. 3.6 (2011),
https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/Judicial_Conduct.pdf. There is no
reason to believe that judicial membership in a religious organization would not be protected
in Connecticut—indeed, as I argue in Part II, such an exemption would be constitutionally
required. Nevertheless, the absence of an express exemption is notable.
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B. Even Though the Boy Scouts Recently Changed Their Policy with
Regard to Gay Scoutmasters, It Is Likely that Membership in Scouting
Could Still Be Barred
On July 27, 2015, the Boy Scouts of America voted to officially
change its controversial policy regarding gay Scoutmasters. 32 This
change came in response to legal pressures faced by the Boy Scouts.33
The newly ratified policy lifts the national ban on gay Scout leaders
but allows individual troops the freedom to set their own policies
with regard to the selection of Scoutmasters. This change was met
with criticism from long-term supporters of Scouting, such as the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 34 and led other churches
to abandon the BSA and join Trail Life USA, a more
conservative alternative. 35
Nevertheless, it is possible that judicial membership in the Boy
Scouts will continue to be foreclosed as a result of the discretion
given to local chapters and affiliates to exclude gay Scout leaders.
Gay rights organizations lambasted the changes as “half steps” 36 and
32. Todd Leopold, Boy Scouts Change Policy on Gay Leaders, CNN (July 28, 2015, 9:16
AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/27/us/boy-scouts-gay-leaders-feat/.
33. Robert M. Gates, National Annual Meeting Remarks, OFFICIAL NEWSROOM BSA
(May 21, 2015), http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/DRGATES-REMARKS.pdf. The California ban was expressly mentioned in a memo from the Boy
Scouts legal counsel at Hughes Hubbard regarding the legal impacts of the new policy.
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Effect of Changes in Adult Leader Standard on Religious
Chartered Organizations, OFFICIAL NEWSROOM BSA, http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Organization-Protections-Memo-062915.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2015).
34. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Church Re-Evaluating Scouting
Program, MORMON NEWSROOM (July 27, 2015), http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/
article/church-re-evaluating-scouting-program; see also The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod,
LCMS Statement on Boy Scouts of America Policy Change, PRESSROOM (July 28, 2015,
10:42:32),
http://blogs.lcms.org/2015/lcms-statement-on-boy-scouts-of-americapolicy-change.
35. Greg Garrison, After Boy Scouts Welcome Gays, Some Churches Start Alternative
Group, AL.COM (Aug. 5, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://www.al.com/living/index.ssf/2015/08/
after_boy_scouts_welcome_gays.html.
36. Liz Halloran, HRC to Boy Scouts of America: You Can’t End Discriminatory Ban
with Half Steps, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN: BLOG (July 13, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/blog/
entry/hrc-to-boy-scouts-of-america-you-cant-end-discriminatory-ban-with-half-step.
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a “monumental step back,” 37 suggesting that the Scouts will face
continued social and legal pressure. 38 At least one court has found
that the relationship between the Scouts and its affiliates might be
described as a principal-agent relationship, which suggests that the
Boy Scouts could be held liable for the conduct of its affiliates. 39
In November 2015, the California Committee on Judicial Ethics
Opinions provided an oral advice summary for California judges.
Rather than providing uniform advice as to whether the ban would
bar judicial membership in religious Scout troops, the summary
noted that each “judge must investigate his troop’s policies,
practices, and values of common interest to the troop members.” 40
This advisory opinion suggests that judges have some discretion in
choosing whether to belong to Scout troops but does not foreclose
the possibility that the ban will be enforced against members of
the judiciary.
This article will proceed based on the assumption that the
California ban and other similar bans will continue to impact the Boy
Scouts. If, however, that is not the case, the arguments are still
applicable to other organizations, such as Trail Life USA, which were
started as a conservative alternative to the Boy Scouts and retain the
37. Dashanne Stokes, Op-Ed: Why the Boy Scouts’ New Policy Still Discriminates,
ADVOCATE (July 20, 2015, 3:00 AM EDT), http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2015/
07/20/op-ed-why-boy-scouts-new-policy-still-discriminates.
38. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision that sexual orientation discrimination is
subject to heightened scrutiny, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 483
(9th Cir. 2014), and the EEOC decision that sexual orientation discrimination is equal to sex
discrimination, it is highly likely that a policy that allows a large number of scouting troops to
exclude gay Scoutmasters will be considered invidious discrimination, at least in California.
Allen Smith, EEOC: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination, SOC’Y FOR
HUM. RES. MGMT. (July 20, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/
pages/eeoc-ruling-sexual-orientation.aspx. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy
Scouts v. Dale relied on the fact that exclusion of homosexuals was essential to the Boy Scouts’
mission and purpose, and the Court’s Dale ruling may, therefore, not continue to shield the
Boy Scouts after the change, opening them up for further litigation.
39. Mayfield v. Boy Scouts of Am., 95 Ohio App. 3d 655 (1994). This argument has
been raised unsuccessfully in other instances. See Randall v. Orange Cty. Council, 952 P.2d
261, 263 (Cal. 1998) (local Cub Scouts allegedly discriminated and plaintiffs also sued the
Scout council); Vargas-Santana v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24004 (D.P.R.
Mar. 30, 2007) (local church troop allegedly discriminated and plaintiffs also sued the BSA).
40. Calif. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics Ops., Oral Advice Summary No.
2015-014 4 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/sites/default/files/
CJEO%20Oral%20Advice%20Summary%202015-014.pdf (discussing judicial membership in
church-sponsored BSA troops).
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policies that were traditionally embraced by the Boy Scouts. 41 And,
regardless of its impact on particular groups, the declaration that
judicial ethics trumps even the freedom of association of expressive
associations is deeply problematic and violates a wide variety of
constitutional rights.
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THE
SCOUT BAN IN WAYS THAT REQUIRE STRICT SCRUTINY
This section will consider the constitutional rights implicated by
the Boy Scout ban. 42 First, the ban most directly burdens freedom of
expressive association. Second, the ban burdens the rights of free
exercise of religion because participation in Scouting is a major part
of the religious tradition of many judges. Third, the ban also
burdens the parental right to direct the upbringing of children. And
in each case, the ban burdens these rights in a way that calls for
strict scrutiny.
A. The Scout Ban Burdens Freedom of Expressive Association
The California canon burdens freedom of association by
preventing judges from participating in expressive organizations such

41. Fred Lucas, Bible-Based Alternative to Boy Scouts Launches After Policy Change for
Gay Scouts, BLAZE (Jan. 2, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/01/
02/bible-based-alternative-to-boy-scouts-launches-after-policy-change-for-gay-scouts/.
42. In addition to the rights that will be discussed, there are more arguments that could
be made that will not receive expanded attention here. An argument can be made, for example,
that the State’s action constitutes a Religious Test Oath or a Bill of Attainder. These arguments
are, in my judgment, less plausible than the ones I have chosen to focus on and so they will
only be described here in brief: First, the ban could constitute a Religious Test Oath because it
creates a job condition which “dampen[s] the exercise generally of First Amendment rights.”
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358 n.11 (1976); see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495
(1961). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the notion that a judge would be required
to recuse himself from certain matters as a result of religious beliefs “stands in conflict with the
principle embedded in Article VI.” Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399,
400 (9th Cir. 1995). If a recusal requirement violates Article VI, then surely a complete bar on
judicial service raises even more serious Article VI concerns. Second, the ban is arguably a Bill
of Attainder because it serves as “legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically
designated persons or groups.” United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965). Although
the rule was ratified by the California Supreme Court rather than a traditional legislator, it is
likely that the Court is acting in a quasi-legislative function. Of course, this argument is
weakened by the fact that removal from office for being a Scout is not retroactive and is not
automatic. A judge would thus be given a hearing before being removed from office.
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as the Boy Scouts. The Supreme Court has long held that freedom
of association is at the core of First Amendment freedoms. In
NAACP v. Alabama, the Court held that requiring the NAACP to
disclose its membership would violate each individual member’s
right to freely associate with groups of his or her choosing. 43 The
Court recognized that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association” and that “state action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the
closest scrutiny.” 44 The Court also explained that any measure which
“would have the practical effect ‘of discouraging’ the exercise of
constitutionally protected political rights” would be subject to strict
scrutiny even if the statute did not facially seem to
target association. 45
Of course, this right to freedom of association is not absolute,
and the Supreme Court has found, at times, that a state has a
sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the individual’s interest
in free association. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court
found that a public accommodations law that required the Jaycees to
accept female members was constitutional. 46 The Court made it clear
that the right to freedom of association was “plainly implicated” and
that “[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the
internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire.” 47 However,
the Court concluded that the “compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination . . . justifies the impact that the application of the
statute . . . may have on the . . . members’ associational freedoms.”48
Because discrimination “deprives persons of their individual dignity
and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political,
economic, and cultural life,” the State clearly had a compelling

43. Interestingly, the Court chose to focus on the rights of members and allowed the
NAACP to litigate on behalf of its membership rather than consider whether the group itself
had a right to be free from scrutiny into its membership. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 458 (1958).
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id. at 461.
46. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
47. Id. at 622–23.
48. Id. at 623.
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interest. 49 The Court also noted that the State’s interest was
“unrelated to the suppression of ideas.” 50 The Court concluded that
this was “the least restrictive means” because it did not impose “any
serious burden on the . . . members’ freedom of expressive
association.” 51 Because there was no evidence that including women
as full members would “impede the organization’s ability to engage
in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views,”
the law burdened expressive activity “no greater than is necessary.” 52
Sixteen years later, the Court reached a drastically different
outcome when considering whether a New Jersey anti-discrimination
ordinance would unduly burden the Boy Scouts’ freedom of
association rights by restricting its ability to exclude gay officers. 53 In
Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court ultimately concluded that the ordinance
violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of
expressive association. 54
In doing so, the Court first considered whether the Boy Scouts
was a group that engaged in “some form of expression.” Because the
organization sought to transmit a system of values to youth, it
qualified as an expressive association. 55 The Court next concluded
that because “homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values
embodied in the Scout Oath and Law,” the anti-discrimination
49. Id. at 625.
50. Id. at 624.
51. Id. at 626.
52. Id. at 628.
53. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 641 (2000). For background on the
Dale cases, see Dennis Amari, Boy Scouts May Discriminate Against Homosexuals on the Basis of
the First Amendment Right of Expressive Association: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000), 9 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 451, 460 (2001). For an overview of the
question of whether a group like the Boy Scouts constitutes a public accommodation for antidiscrimination laws, see William F. Grady, The Boy Scouts of America As a “Place of Public
Accommodation”: Developments in State Law, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 524 (1999) (discussing
the evolution of the question of whether a group like the Scouts is a public accommodation).
54. See generally David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121,
124 (2001) (suggesting a variety of ways to reconcile Dale and freedom of association
decisions that predate it); see also Fredrick W. Quast, Does Morally Straight Mean Only Straight
Is Moral?: The First Amendment Versus Public Accommodation Laws in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 530 (2001) (arguing that the Court struck the proper
balance in Dale regarding expressive association rights).
55. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650–51. But see Mark Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy
Scout Case Was Rightly (but Wrongly) Decided, 35 CONN. L. REV. 129, 130 (2002) (arguing
that all membership decisions are inherently expressive).
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ordinance would limit the group’s “ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints.” 56 Although the dissent argued that including gay
individuals was not truly antithetical to the Scout’s mission, 57 the
Court gave substantial deference to the group’s stated values and
beliefs, explaining that “it is not the role of the courts to reject a
group’s expressed values because they disagree with those values or
find them internally inconsistent.” 58 The Court also explained that it
“must also give deference to an association’s view of what would
impair its expression.” 59 Nor must a group “trumpet its views from
the housetops” in order to receive “First Amendment protection.”60
Moreover, because the ban directly restricted associational rights,
strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review. Examining the
State’s purported interest in requiring the Scouts to include gay
members, the Court made it clear that “public or judicial disapproval
of a tenet of an organization’s expression does not justify the State’s

56. Professor Garnett has urged the Supreme Court to reconsider the Jaycees opinion in
light of Dale. Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S. Arnold and the
Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587 (2005). He persuasively argues that membership
in and of itself should raise First Amendment concerns even if the group does not express a
position on a particular issue of public concern. Id. Were the Court to reevaluate the Jaycees
opinion, it would only further strengthen the arguments advanced regarding the judicial Scout
ban. See id. at 601 (“The conduct at issue—i.e., discrimination in membership and
leadership—is of First Amendment concern not simply because it is freighted with or
motivated by ideas, but because it goes to the structure and identity of the association as
an association.”).
57. Dale, 530 U.S. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 651 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 653. But see N. Nicole Endejann, Coming Out Is a Free Pass Out: Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, 34 AKRON L. REV. 893, 909 (2001) (criticizing Dale on the basis that it
failed to require the group to prove that its identity would truly be compromised).
60. Dale, 530 U.S. at 656; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries:
Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 650 (2001) (“But expression worthy of
First Amendment protection need not be explicit or broadcast to the public at large, and a
threat to associational activity built around such expression need not be particularly
dramatic.”). But some have suggested that it is precisely the fact that a group must be open
about its discriminatory practices to qualify for protection under Dale which justifies the
Court’s conclusion. See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1019
(2013) (“Another advantage is that, because freedom of association protects expressive
association, it forces organizations to be clear about their membership rules and about what
membership in their organizations represents and expresses. It would be better to force
religious organizations to state openly their willingness to discriminate on the basis of race,
gender, disabilities, sexual orientation, national origin, and age than to give them the free pass
to disobey the laws for any reason that the Court awarded them in Hosanna-Tabor.”).
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effort” to regulate membership in an expressive association. 61
Accordingly, the State lacked a truly compelling interest that could
justify intruding upon the organization’s interest in expressive
association. Indeed, the State cannot “interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one.” 62
Yet this is precisely the rationale underlying the Scout ban. 63 As
Noah Feldman has pointed out, the ultimate purpose of the ban on
membership in organizations that engage in discrimination is to
express
collective
moral
disapproval
of
discriminatory
organizations. 64 However, as Feldman argues, this rationale is clearly
problematic when read against the Court’s ruling in Dale. Dale
makes it clear that, despite society’s clearly compelling interest in
limiting discrimination, a ban on expressive associations exceeds the
limits of the First Amendment. 65 If a group is protected by First
Amendment association rights, then punishing an organization or its
members in order to show moral disapproval of the organization’s
membership practices is forbidden under the First Amendment.
Furthermore, under Dale, it is clear that the Scout ban
significantly burdens judges’ freedom of association. Judges are no
longer able to join an expressive association and to partner with
likeminded individuals. While judges are free to be members of other
organizations, those judges who feel connected to the Scout’s motto
are barred from association. As a result, they are unable to participate

61. Dale, 530 U.S. at 661.
62. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
579 (1995).
63. See Grindlay, supra note 5, at 562 .
64. Noah Feldman, Should California Judges Join the Boy Scouts?, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Jan. 27, 2015, 8:54 AM EST), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-27/
should-california-judges-join-the-boy-scouts-.
65. Thus, even if society can be said to have a compelling interest in limiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it does not necessarily follow that it has a
compelling interest in restricting associative freedoms on that basis. See Tribe, supra note 60, at
654 (“Indeed, even when a particular characteristic has come to be seen as presumptively
impermissible for the state to employ in classifying persons, as I believe sexual orientation
ought to be, the state’s interest in imposing that particular egalitarian and liberty-enhancing
vision upon a private person or association cannot automatically be deemed compelling
without further inquiry into the size and nature of the association and the adverse social or
economic consequences for those ‘discriminated’ against.”).

1394

ORTNER.FINORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1381

4/21/2016 10:50 AM

Scout’s Honor

in the many valuable community- and society-building activities
of Scouting.
Moreover, the Ban also burdens the associational rights of the
BSA: If forbidding an expressive association from excluding an
individual violates freedom of association, then certainly forbidding
an association from including an individual that it wishes to see as a
member likewise violates freedom of association. 66
B. The Scout Ban Burdens Free Exercise Interests
The Scout ban also restricts the free exercise of religious judges,
churches, and the BSA itself. And it does so in a way that requires
the application of strict scrutiny.
1. The ban places burdens on faiths that see scouting as a
religious ministry
Participation in Boy Scouts is an important facet of the youth
programs of a variety of churches in the United States. For instance,
for Catholics, “[p]articipation in Boy Scouts is a Youth Ministry of
the Catholic Church” with meetings occurring on church property
and with the participation of priests. 67 Likewise, for the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “LDS” or “Mormon” Church),
Scouting “functions as an integral part of the Church’s activity
program.” 68 Indeed, individuals in the LDS Church are occasionally
given church assignments to serve in the Boy Scout program. As one
California judge described it: “The men consider it a religious
obligation and commitment to accept these assignments and to assist

66. Of the burdened rights, ruling on the freedom of association grounds likely has the
broadest implications for laws that exclude judges from group membership. Any restriction on
membership in expressive associations such as the Boy Scouts would be highly suspect and
subject to strict scrutiny. Given that the Dale decision dealt specifically with membership in the
Boy Scouts, this argument also seems the most likely to gain traction among judges reviewing
a challenge to the canon.
67. AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 332 at 142 (comment of Hon.
Barbara A. Kronlund); see also Scouting in the Catholic Community, BOY SCOUTS AM.,
http://www.scouting.org/About/FactSheets/operating_orgs/Catholic.aspx (last updated
Mar. 2011).
68. Scouting in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Community, BOY SCOUTS
AM.,
http://www.scouting.org/About/FactSheets/operating_orgs/Latter-day_Saints.aspx
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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with the Boy Scout program.” 69 Service in the Scouts is seen by
individuals as part of “their duty to God.” 70
For members of these churches and many other faiths, the ban
would substantially burden the free exercise of religion. Even though
in theory one is able to attend Boy Scout events without being a
member of the organization, attending critical events such as Scout
Camp with one’s children requires formal membership in the Boy
Scouts. 71 Moreover, individuals feel a duty to accept assignments that
are given by religious leaders, which could include service in Boy
Scout leadership. One commentator emphasized that: “[b]ecause of
my faith, I do not feel it would be appropriate to turn down such
‘callings’ of service.” 72 Another California judge emphasized that,
“[t]o deprive me of serving as a member or leader in my
congregation’s local boy scout [sic] units would, at least in my case,
deny me the religious freedom preserved by the Constitutions I have
taken a solemn oath to uphold.” 73 Thus, it is clear that the free
exercise rights of these judges would be substantially burdened by
the ban.
The Boy Scout ban also burdens the free exercise interests of the
many churches that sponsor Boy Scout units. Indeed, some religious
organizations, such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, consider Scout leadership to be a ministerial calling.
Effectively prohibiting a church from appointing a judge to a
particular ministerial position seems deeply inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor that such
interference in the internal affairs of churches violates both the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 74 At a minimum, such

69. AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 14 at 11 (comment of Philip M.
Andersen, Sr.).
70. Id.
71. Id. cmt. 332 at 146 (comment of Hon. Barbara A. Kronlund).
72. Id. cmt. 350 at 157 (comment of Nathan Lewis).
73. Id. cmt. 369 at 163 (comment of Hon. Roger L. Lund).
74. Of course, the application of the ministerial exception requires a threshold finding
that a position is ministerial. Although a fuller discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this article, it seems highly likely at the very least that a member of the LDS Church who is
called to be a Young Men’s Leader and a Scout Leader is a minister. Some of the public
commentary on the proposed amendment illustrates this point. For instance, one
commentator noted that “[p]articipation is done by calling or assignment by church leaders. It
is generally accepted that such a ‘call’ is by divine direction and rejection of such a calling
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a prohibition is a serious intrusion into a church’s free exercise
interest in choosing its own ministers and leaders. In particular, with
the LDS Church, many adult leaders, including bishops (the
equivalent of parish priests), are expected to register with the Boy
Scouts—which makes this restriction on the ability of churches to
select
ministers
even
more
troubling
from
a
free
exercise standpoint. 75
The free exercise rights of the Boy Scouts as an organization
might also be burdened by the ban. Although the Boy Scouts does
not formally claim to be a religious organization, it persuasively
established in Dale that its gay Scout leader ban is motivated by
religious and moral teachings. 76 And with its Hobby Lobby decision,

would not be appropriate.” Id. cmt. 5 at 4 (comment of Franklin C. Adams); see also id. cmt.
14 at 11 (comment of Philip M. Andersen, Sr.) (“The men feel it is their duty to God to hold
these leadership positions in the Boy Scout program.”); id. cmt. 43 at 296 (comment of Jeffrey
S. Bostwick) ( “The willingness of Latter-day Saints to respond to calls to serve is a
representation of their desire to do the will of the Lord . . . . It is not in the proper spirit for us
to decide where we will serve or where we will not. It does not matter what the call may be.”
(quoting Boyd K. Packer, Acting President of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 167th Semiannual General Conference: Called to
Serve (Oct. 4, 1997), in ENSIGN, Nov. 1997)).
75. Id. cmt. 532 at 241 (comment of Jeffrey W. Shields).
76. There is considerable ongoing debate as to whether the Boy Scouts is a religious
organization. The Boy Scouts currently maintains that although it is motivated by religious
values, it is not a religious organization. A federal district court judge in California concluded
that the Boy Scouts was a religious organization for purposes of the Establishment Clause. See
Associated Press, Court Won’t Hear Appeal on Boy Scouts Land Rental, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB. (May 3, 2010, 8:24 AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/may/03/courtwont-hear-appeal-on-boy-scouts-land-rental/. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conclusion that
the Boy Scouts “is a religious organization” as a result of the reference to Duty to God in the
Scout oath and encouragement for members to earn the religious emblem of their faith.
Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). For discussion in
the media, see The O’Reilly Factor: Is the Boy Scouts of America a Religious Organization?
(FoxNews television broadcast Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/01/
16/is-boy-scouts-america-religious-organization/ (partial transcript of broadcast). Other
courts, in contrast, have concluded the opposite. See Powell v. Bunn, 59 P.3d 559, 579-80 (Or.
Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the Boy Scouts is not religious because “the bulk of Boy
Scouts’ activities is secular”); see also Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of
Ladue, 859 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Powell v. Bunn, 59 P.3d 559 (Or. Ct. App.
2002). The Boy Scouts itself has made arguments regarding religious freedom, which suggest
that it sees itself as religious to some degree or another. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F.
Supp. 1413, 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also Erez Reuveni, On Boy Scouts and AntiDiscrimination Law: The Associational Rights of Quasi-Religious Organizations, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 113 (2006) (arguing “that the BSA is a quasi-religious organization deserving
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the Court made it clear that entities that are not formally religiously
affiliated may still bring religious freedom claims. 77
Because the values of the Boy Scouts are heavily religiously
motivated, it is problematic for the State to conclude that the group
practices invidious discrimination in the first place. The canon
requires consideration of whether the group is “dedicated to the
preservation of religious, ethnic, or cultural values of legitimate
common interest to its members.” 78 Yet, as the Supreme Court has
noted, “it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection
of the First Amendment.” 79 Classifying the Boy Scouts as a nonreligious organization that engages in invidious discrimination, while
exempting other similarly situated church-led youth organizations, is
thus deeply problematic and suggests that one of the aims of the law
seems to be shaming the Boy Scouts into changing its religiously
motivated practices by making membership in the organization seem
unacceptable or undesirable. 80

greater associational protections than secular organizations”). See generally Zoë Robinson,
What Is A “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 210 (2014).
77. The Hobby Lobby decision only concerned an interpretation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act rather than the First Amendment itself. Nevertheless, there is no
reason to believe that the application of RFRA to non-religiously affiliated organizations would
not also apply equally to the First Amendment.
78. To determine this, the State would be required to engage in a burdensome and
sweeping inquiry into the group’s religious beliefs and practices to determine whether the
group in fact engages in invidious discrimination. As the New York Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee acknowledged when it was asked to determine whether the Freemasons engaged in
invidious discrimination, such a determination would require a “fair ranging investigation into
the history, background, policies and internal membership of the organization.” New York
Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Opinion 96–82 (1997), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
judicialethics/opinions/96-82.htm. Yet, such a “fair ranging investigation” into the policies
and practices of quasi-religious organizations such as the Boy Scouts also raises Establishment
Clause concerns. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause As a Structural Restraint on
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 77 (1998) (“[R]egulatory burdens that touch on
matters in the religious domain (doctrine, polity, clerics, church membership) violate
no establishment.”).
79. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
80. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism,
99 VA. L. REV. 917, 977 (2013) (using the Dale case to emphasize that rights of religion and
association exceed the scope of religious organizations).
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2. Why these burdens require strict scrutiny
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court broke with
past precedent and concluded that neutral and generally applicable
laws which incidentally burden religious expression are presumptively
valid and are only subject to rational basis review. 81 Under such a
standard, the ban would almost certainly be upheld. 82 However,
there are at least two bases under which strict scrutiny may still be
the appropriate standard of review: First, the hybrid rights
exemption, and second, the fact that the Boy Scout ban can be said
to be directly discriminatory on the basis of religion.
a. The hybrid rights exception should apply. As to the first basis:
The Court in Smith pointed to a potential hybrid rights exception as
a way to explain certain classes of violations of religious freedom
which had previously been subject to strict scrutiny. The Court
explained: “The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections.” 83 As an illustration, the Court pointed to
cases that involved laws that adversely impacted “the right of
parents . . . to direct the education of their children.” 84 The Court
also expressly noted that “it is easy to envision a case in which a
challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be
reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.” 85
Although there is considerable scholarly debate as to whether the
hybrid rights exception has any independent weight, this case seems
to be a paradigmatic case for the application of such an exception if it

81. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the
denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans fired because of their religious use
of peyote).
82. While Part III argues extensively that preventing the appearance of partiality should
not be a compelling governmental interest, it certainly can be classified as a legitimate
governmental interest, and there is little question that the ban is at least rationally related to
advancing that interest.
83. Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 881.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 882.
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exists. 86 It involves both freedom of association claims, which have
religious implications, and restrictions on the ability of parents to
freely direct the religious upbringing of their children, which will be
discussed below. 87 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case that more
fully presents a hybrid claim of the type talked about in Smith
because each of the other claims is “reinforced” by the existence of
deeply held religious beliefs that urge membership in the Boy Scouts.
Moreover, given that freedom of association and freedom of speech
are somewhat muddled when applied to government employees, this
might be a case in which the hybrid rights claim has teeth and would
be embraced by a court hoping to avoid stepping into the employeespeech quagmire. 88
b. The ban purposefully singles out religious practice for
discriminatory treatment. The other major exception to the standard
articulated in Smith arises in cases where religious observance is
singled out for targeting or discriminatory treatment. In Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to such a law enacted by the City of Hialeah, which
restricted religious ritual sacrifice while carving out a wide range of
exemptions for other causes. 89 The Court explained that “if the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral.” 90 Even though the
statute in question at first glance appeared facially neutral, the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause “forbids subtle departures from

86. See Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the
Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v.
Anaya, 85 NEB. L. REV. 311 (2006) (arguing that a Nebraska court should have applied strict
scrutiny in a case regarding parent’s refusal to get medical care for their child); Hope Lu,
Comment, Addressing the Hybrid-Rights Exception: How the Colorable-Plus Approach Can
Revive the Free Exercise Clause, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 257 (2012); Fredrick Mark Gedicks,
Three Questions about Hybrid Rights and Religious Groups, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 192
(2008),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/three-questions-about-hybrid-rights-andreligious-groups.
87. Infra Section II.C.
88. See infra Section II.D.
89. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
90. Id. at 533.
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neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.”91
“[G]overnmental hostility which is masked” is still forbidden. 92
To determine whether a law that appeared facially neutral in fact
was motivated by anti-religious animus, the Court considered several
factors: It looked to the language of the text, the disparate impact
the law would have on religious organizations, and the legislative
history—all of which suggested the law was motivated out of a desire
to harm a religious observance. 93 The Court also was concerned with
the law’s lack of general applicability, explaining that “inequality
results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it
seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct
with a religious motivation.” 94 Severe under-inclusion was thus fatal.
Just as with the religious animal slaughter in Lukumi, the Scout
ban “pursues the [government’s] . . . interests only against conduct
motivated by religious belief.” 95 While it theoretically bans
membership in any organization that engages in invidious
discrimination, it is clear from the proposal and commentary that the
ban was focused on membership in a particular set of organizations
whose policies on homosexuality are based on the religious beliefs of
its major allies. Thus, while the law theoretically might apply to
other youth groups such as the Girl Scouts, it is clearly “covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs” and a not so subtle
departure from neutrality. 96 Indeed, the commentary is filled with
criticism of the beliefs that animate the Boy Scouts as well as
comments generally hostile to religion. 97 In addition, membership in
other public and community organizations is not merely allowed,
but encouraged. 98
Nor should the analysis change because the State is eliminating
an existing exemption that was crafted for the Boy Scouts. Indeed,
the circumstances of the passage of this change lend even more
credence to a conclusion of animus. A previously rejected
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 540–43.
Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 534.
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
See infra Section IV.A.
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amendment was revived precisely at the time when the Boy Scouts
came under increased criticism for their policies and passed in short
order despite an overwhelming number of critical public comments.
This suggests not merely disagreement with the Scouts’ membership
practices but hostility to the religious beliefs and practices underlying
the organization’s policy. Accordingly, the Lukumi exception should
apply to California’s ban, and the State should be required to justify
it by offering a compelling governmental interest and showing that it
has advanced that interest through the least restrictive
means possible.
Even if neither of these exceptions applies, heightened scrutiny
may still apply as a matter of state law. Many states have either passed
state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) or interpreted
their own constitutions to require a heightened level of protection
for free exercise claims. 99 While California does not have a RFRA and
has refused to decide whether or not it follows Employment Division
v. Smith as a matter of State constitutional law, if other states with
RFRAs adopt similar bans, heightened scrutiny should apply to
those bans. 100
Moreover, the line between forbidding religiously motivated
membership in organizations such as the Boy Scouts and excluding
membership in religious organizations is quite thin. 101 Indeed, some
have argued that membership in religious organizations inevitably
leads to judicial partiality on a wide variety of topics. For instance,
one commentator on the proposed amendment urged eliminating
the religious exemption altogether because membership in a religion
can limit the ability of a judge to apply “the law in an impartial

99. WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH, RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 2:63 (2013).
100. Id. § 2:64.
101. See Eric Metaxas, De-Judging the Boy Scouts, BREAKPOINT (Feb. 5, 2010, 8:00
AM), http://www.breakpoint.org/bpcommentaries/entry/12/26818 (“It’s not that hard to
imagine a setting in the not-too-distant future when membership in any of these religious
groups will be seen as incompatible with being a judge. This is especially true when you learn
that the advisory panel cited ‘recent developments in the law regarding same-sex relationships.’
While religious groups are still exempt for now, these same ‘recent developments’ have made
their First Amendment rights increasingly precarious.”).

1402

ORTNER.FINORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1381

4/21/2016 10:50 AM

Scout’s Honor

matter.” 102 Of course, banning membership in a religious
organization would raise deeper Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause concerns and be deeply inconsistent with our nation’s history
and tradition. Yet, if the State’s interest is truly compelling enough
to ban membership in the Boy Scouts, why is that interest not also
sufficiently
compelling
to
limit
membership
in
religious organizations? 103
Indeed, one California judge plausibly argued in his comment on
the proposed change that allowing for individuals to belong to
religious groups that participate in discrimination, but not certain
other groups that likewise practice discrimination, “cannot promote
public confidence in the judiciary” and is therefore inconsistent with
the State’s interest. 104 It is difficult to make a principled case for
allowing judges to belong to religious associations that engage in socalled invidious discrimination but not in secular associations that do
the same. Regardless, the Scout ban burdens the associational and
free exercise rights of judges from a wide variety of religious
backgrounds, and does so in ways that require strict scrutiny. 105

102. AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 225 at 98 (comment of
Elena Gross).
103. One reason might be avoiding a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, a violation of the Establishment Clause would serve as a total bar on government
conduct and there can be no sufficiently compelling interest to justify a violation. As Professor
Esbeck argued in a highly influential article, the Establishment Clause serves as a structural
restraint on government rather than a “rights based” clause. See Esbeck, supra note 78; see also
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical,
Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1997807 (arguing that this is one of the key reasons that the Establishment Clause was rightly
incorporated against the states). Yet, as already mentioned, the Scout ban in and of itself raises
the same Establishment Clause concerns. See supra notes 62, 65, & 66 and accompanying text.
104. AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 342 at 152 (comment of Hon.
Edward F. Lee).
105. A ruling on the Free Exercise Clause would be narrow, as the proper remedy would
be to allow membership in organizations where membership is seen as part of a judge’s
religious obligations and duties. One shortcoming with this approach is that it allows certain
judges the ability to belong to a group, while denying others the ability to belong to the same
group, even though both wish to affiliate with the group and identify with the group’s purpose
and mission. Thus, a ruling on the Free Exercise Clause or a state RFRA would be somewhat
less desirable than a ruling on one of the other proposed bases discussed here.
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C. The Scout Ban Burdens the Rights of Some Parents to Direct the
Upbringing of Their Children
A restriction on a judge’s participation in Boy Scouts may also
infringe that judge’s ability to direct the upbringing of his children.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”106
Because many parents want to help direct their children’s education
through participation in Scouting, and sometimes are required to
participate so that their children may participate in key events such as
scout camp, 107 the ban on Scout membership substantially burdens
this fundamental right.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court first considered this
parental right when it invalidated an ordinance that made teaching
children in any language other than English illegal if those students
had not yet passed the eighth grade. 108 The Court explained that the
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment protected
the right of an individual to “establish a home and bring up
children.” 109 The Court emphasized that “it is the natural duty of the
parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life.” 110 It was improper for the State to interfere “with the power of
parents to control the education of their own.” 111
The Supreme Court again affirmed the fundamental nature of
this right in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, when it struck down a
compulsory education law which would have restricted the ability of
parents to educate their children at home or through private
schools. 112 The Court famously emphasized that “[t]he child is not
the mere creature of the State,” and that parents “who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” 113

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397–99 (1923).
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Id. at 401.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 535.
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The parental autonomy right recognized in both Meyer and
Pierce was further extended by Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the
Court upheld the right of Amish families to violate compulsory
school laws on Free Exercise grounds. 114 The Court emphasized:
“the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and
education of their children in their early and formative years have a
high place in our society” and that, absent “a state interest of
sufficient magnitude,” any restriction on such direction would be
invalid. 115 Any law that substantially burdens parental autonomy
must, therefore, survive strict scrutiny. 116
More recent decisions have also reaffirmed the vital interest that
parents have in directing the upbringing of their children. In Troxel
v. Granville, the Court invalidated a statute that allowed state courts
to award visitation rights to a paternal grandparent against the wishes
of the parents. 117 In so doing, it emphasized that “it cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” 118 As the
Court made clear:
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of
that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of
that parent’s children. 119

114. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
115. Id. at 213–14.
116. Despite the strong language in Yoder, the Court’s decisions in this area are not
entirely clear as to what the proper standard of review would be if a law burdened a parent’s
right to direct his or her child’s upbringing. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence
in Troxel v. Granville—one of the more recent Supreme Court decisions to invoke this right—
none of the other justices who embraced the parental right actually articulated “the
appropriate standard of review.” 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas chose to “apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights,” id., and his
choice seems most consistent with requiring a state interest of “sufficient magnitude,” Yoder,
406 U.S. at 214, but it is possible that the Court might apply intermediate scrutiny.
Considering the fundamental nature of parental autonomy, strict scrutiny appears to be the
proper standard.
117. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
118. Id. at 66.
119. Id. at 68.
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Justice Stevens dissented, but also recognized the right and even saw
it in a somewhat more expansive light as providing parents “a
corresponding privacy interest—absent exceptional circumstances”
to care and guide for their children “without the undue interference
of strangers to them and to their child.” 120 Indeed, the right to
parental autonomy has closely been linked to the notion of a “private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” 121
For many parents, having their children participate in the Scouts
is an integral part of the child’s moral, spiritual, and ethical
education. 122 Moreover, as one commentator noted, a parent is
required to participate in Cub Scout activities and is expected to
participate in Boy Scout activities as well. 123 Even if parental presence
is not strictly mandated, it is strongly encouraged. 124 At the Boy
Scouts level, moreover, only male parents are allowed to participate
in many activities, such as campouts, which are integral to the
Scouting program. And, for many parents, participation in Scouts
with their children is an important bonding experience. 125 Parental
involvement also allows the parent to help ensure that the child

120. Id. at 87; see also Bruce Frohnen, Liberation Jurisprudence: How Activist Courts
Have Torn Family and Society Asunder, FAM. POL’Y, May–June 2001, at 1 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws have been harmful to families because of an increasing focus on the rights
of the individual as opposed to the collective needs and rights of the family).
121. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also David D. Meyer, The
Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 541 (2008).
122. Indeed, in Dale, it may have been the Scouts’ critical role in helping some parents
to bring up their children with moral values that led the Supreme Court to rule in favor of the
Scouts. See Neal Troum, Expressive Association and the Right to Exclude: Reading Between the
Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 689 (2002) (arguing
that the fact that the Scouts played a role in childrearing was ultimately a critical factor in the
Court’s decision to hold that the expressive association rights of the Scouts justified exclusion
of gay Scouts); see also John C. O’Quinn, Note, Recent Developments: The United States
Supreme Court, 1999 Term “How Solemn Is the Duty of the Mighty Chief”: Mediating the
Conflict of Rights in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 319, 354 (2000) (emphasizing that the Boy Scouts embody characteristics of
other protected intimate associations).
123. AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 2 at 1 (comment of
Rene Abraham).
124. Id. cmt. 493 at 217 (comment of Hon. Craig G. Riemer).
125. As a practical matter, one commentator pointed out that this change might make it
more difficult for California to attract qualified judges since judges must make the choice
between participating in youth organizations with their families or their judicial nomination.
Id. cmt. 484 at 212 (comment of Hon. Roger D. Randall).
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learns the desired moral lessons from his experience in Scouts.126
Thus, even if the children are able to participate in the Scouting
program without their parents, the judicial Scouting ban adversely
impacts and burdens the ability of parents to direct their child’s
education. 127 Accordingly, the Scout ban must be justified by truly
compelling State interests and satisfy strict scrutiny.128

126. Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s parental rights doctrine is too
focused on the rights of parents without sufficient concern for the rights of children. See, e.g.,
AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton 1987); David Gan-wing Cheng,
Wisconsin v. Yoder: Respecting Children’s Rights and Why Yoder Should Be Overturned, 4
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 45, 47 (2013) (arguing that Yoder should be overturned because children
should have a “right to an open future”). But see Jocelyn Floyd, The Power of the Parental
Trump Card: How and Why Frazier v. Winn Got It Right, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 791, 792
(2010) (discussing cases involving a tension between parental and child interests); Richard W.
Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 114 (2000) (arguing that harm should be narrowly defined in
order to allow parents discretion); Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!,
16 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 186 (1999) (reviewing JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V.
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (1998)) (defending the parent’s right against Establishment Clause
concerns advanced by other scholars). Unlike some of those situations, allowing parental
participation in the Boy Scouts is one situation where parental and child rights are balanced
because the child is already participating in Scouts, so there is no sense of parental interest
trumping the interest of the child.
127. Of course, the right to direct the upbringing of one’s child does not give the parent
unlimited rights. A parent, for instance, could not demand the right to attend school with her
child or demand a particularized public school curriculum. But see Noa Ben-Asher, The
Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 363 (2012) (arguing for a limited right of parents to
influence a child’s curriculum based on values). Yet, when the Government prohibits a parent
from participating in an activity with her children that all other parents are able to engage in,
serious constitutional concerns arise. See Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 760 (2013). This is especially true given that parents “have a
liberty interest in rearing offspring in the parents’ chosen value systems.” Id. See generally
Matthew Ormiston, Parental Choice and School Vouchers: A Viable Facet of Texas Public
Education Reform?, 9 SCHOLAR 497, 518 (2007). Accordingly, a law that significantly burdens
the “parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children” must be justified
under strict scrutiny. Id.; see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. A ruling striking down the Scout ban on parental autonomy grounds would also be
quite narrow in that it would only impact membership in youth organizations such as the Boy
Scouts. Such a ruling would effectively restore the pre-existing youth organization exception
but do little to impact membership in other non-youth organizations. On the other hand, such
a ruling would be a pretty substantial expansion of the ability of parents to be involved in the
upbringing of their children.
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D. Strict Scrutiny Should Still Apply even Though the Scout Ban
Restricts Judicial Conduct
While it is unquestionable that a general restriction on
membership in the Boy Scouts would raise several constitutional
concerns, California might attempt to defend the Scout ban on the
ground that judges are unique and have been treated differently
both as a result of their judicial office and as a result of their general
status as public officers. However, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that even though the State can impose greater restrictions on its
officers, the State is still constitutionally limited in its ability to
restrict the exercise of fundamental rights. 129 Likewise, in recent
years, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the speech and
conduct of judges are constitutionally protected. 130
1. Public officers generally retain their constitutional rights
For example, the Court has made it clear that a public servant,
including a government officer, cannot be fired “on a basis that

129. Most of the cases deal with either freedom of speech or freedom of association
rather than free exercise or parental autonomy, but there is no reason to think that the State
would be allowed to impinge on these rights in situations when it cannot impinge on the
judge’s speech rights. Indeed, it seems likely that the State would have even less of a
justification for impinging on the parental decisions that employees or judges make, because
these decisions are far less likely to directly impact the employees’ work. Moreover, as
mentioned in the previous section, parental rights are also protected under a theory of privacy
as a sphere of conduct where the Government simply has less reason to intrude or invade. As
such, the Government has a weaker case for the termination of an employee for conduct
involving an exercise of parental rights.
130. Freedom of Association and other constitutional rights have frequently come up in
the context of lawyers and admission to the bar. For instance, in Konigsberg v. State Bar, the
Supreme Court overturned a decision by the California Bar to deny admission to the bar of an
individual who was suspected of being a member of the Communist Party. 353
U.S.
252
(1957). After concluding that the character and fitness evidence submitted on the prospective
attorney’s behalf overwhelmingly supported his admission, the Court turned to the question
of whether Communist Party membership would have been disqualifying. Id. at 264–68. The
applicant was accused of membership in 1941 when the organization was fully legal and
membership in the organization did not lead to any kind of penalty. Id. at 267–68. Nor could
the fact that “some members of that party were involved in illegal or disloyal activities” justify
sweeping the individual into that group and excluding him. Id. at 267. Thus, the Court has
made it clear that such bans are highly disfavored in the context of the legal profession. See id.
at 267–68.
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infringes his constitutionally protected interests.” 131 If the
Government were able to do so, it would allow the Government to
“produce a result which [the Government] could not command
directly.” 132 In other words, as a general matter of principle, the
Government cannot penalize a public servant for conduct that it
otherwise could not prohibit or proscribe generally.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has made it clear that conditioning
public employment on an employee’s pledging not to belong to a
disfavored but legal organization is unconstitutional. For instance, in
Elfbrandt v. Russell, the Court concluded that a loyalty oath which
required employees to swear that they had not been members of an
organization dedicated to overthrowing the government was
impermissible even though overthrowing the government constitutes
an illegal objective. 133 The Court concluded that because
membership was not necessarily “accompanied by a specific intent to
further the unlawful aims of the organization,” this was an
illegitimate
basis
for
excluding
an
individual
from
134
public employment.
On the other hand, the Court has at times been more solicitous
of restrictions on the freedom of speech and the free exercise of
public officers. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court overturned a decision to fire a teacher who wrote an opinioneditorial that was critical of the school board. 135 The Court laid out a
balancing test “between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer.” 136 However, in doing so, the Court explained
that a teacher could not be punished for speech that had not

131. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Treatment of the speech of
lawyers is also closely analogous and highly relevant. For instance, in Gentile v. State Bar, the
Court declared that a rule limiting the ability of lawyers to make extrajudicial statements was
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Although this decision did “not
call into question the constitutionality of other State’s prohibitions of attorney’s speech,” the
Court emphasized that because this was a “punishment of pure speech” there was no
“standard of diminished First Amendment protection.” Id. at 1034–35.
132. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
133. 384 U.S. 11 (1966); accord Grindlay, supra note 5, at 564.
134. Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 16.
135. 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
136. Id. at 568.
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“impeded the . . . proper performance of his daily duties.” 137 Because
the teacher’s speech in Pickering did not interfere with his ability to
teach, the State did not have a “significantly greater . . . interest in
limiting” the teacher’s speech than that of the general public’s. 138
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the Pickering
balancing test in Connick v. Meyers, leading this balancing test to
commonly be referred to as the Pickering-Connick test. 139 But this
test has been highly controversial and notoriously difficult for lower
courts to apply. 140
Moreover, for several reasons, it is doubtful that the ConnickPickering test applies to judges. First, judges are not employees in
the traditional sense and often have some form of tenure and
heightened job protection. Furthermore, many of the policy
considerations motivating Connick, such as ensuring employeesupervisor unity, simply do not apply in the judicial context. 141

137.
138.
139.

Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See generally DAVID L. HUDSON JR.,
BALANCING ACT: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND FREE SPEECH
(Dec.
2002),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/First
Report.PublicEmployees.pdf (describing application of the Pickering-Connick test in a variety
of contexts).
140. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to
a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 119 (2006) (“Pickering guaranteed a
steady flow of doctrinal disputes for decades to come.”); Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to
Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 98
(2007) (“[T]he Court’s ruling created a compartmentalization that not only leaves public
employees vulnerable to retaliation for exposing governmental misconduct or inefficiencies,
but also neglects the public’s interest in hearing such speech.”); Molly K. Smith, Compelled
Investigatory and Testimonial Speech: An Overdue Clarification of the Public Employee Speech
Doctrine that Rehabilitates “All of the Values at Stake,” 101 KY. L.J. 403, 408 (2012–13) (“As
the public employee speech doctrine evolved, certain drawbacks of the case-by-case approach
of Connick-Pickering became apparent.”).
141. Another lingering question is whether the Conning-Pickering test is the appropriate
test for employee free exercise claims or religion-related statutory claims under Title VII or
RFRA. At least two courts of appeals have applied this test in the context of religious freedom
claims. See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001); Brown v. Polk
Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995). The Pickering-Conning test seems inappropriate for
religious freedom claims insomuch that religious freedom claims should be fully protected
whether or not they touch on a matter of public concern. For instance, a Sikh hoping to carry
a Kirpan to work would not be expressing an opinion on any matter of great public concern,
but participating in an act of personal devotion. Yet, it seems absurd that his claim should
receive less protection than a claim of an individual seeking to discuss his religious views about
homosexuality in the workplace. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the public concern prong
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Additionally, as will be further discussed in the following section, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that our judicial system is enriched
rather than undermined when judges have and express their opinions
on matters of public concern. Thus, Connick-Pickering should not
be seen as reducing the standard of review for restrictions on judicial
speech. Instead, strict scrutiny should apply with full force.
Nor do other decisions applying the reasoning of Pickering
support the Boy Scout ban. For instance, the Supreme Court’s
decision in U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, AFL–CIO, upholding portions of the Hatch Act that
prohibited federal employees from “taking an active part in political
management or in political campaigns,” 142 does not support the
Scout ban. First, the Hatch Act was linked to a prohibition on civil
servant political activity that reached back to the Jefferson
Administration. That history thus gave the Hatch Act a strong
historical pedigree—unlike a prohibition on judicial group
membership, which lacks this historical pedigree. 143 Moreover, unlike
the ban on membership in only certain disfavored groups, the Hatch
Act’s prohibitions were also truly neutral and applied equally to all
“parties, groups, or points of view.” 144 Additionally, the type of
corruption that the Hatch Act sought to remedy, where civil servants
received patronage and support for their electioneering conduct, is
much more akin to quid pro quo corruption than the mere
appearance of partiality that the State asserts exists with judicial
membership in the Boy Scouts. 145 Most importantly, the decision in
Letter Carriers predates the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, such
as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 146 and Citizens United v.
FEC, 147 in which efforts to reduce partiality or corruption have
received far more searching scrutiny. Indeed, as the following section
would be met in any case involving the Boy Scouts as a result of the fact that the group has
come to stand very publically for a certain position on a matter of great public concern.
142. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO, 413 U.S.
548, 562 (1973).
143. These historical arguments seem critical to the Court’s decision and, absent the
same historical pedigree, it is not likely that the Court would have upheld the Hatch Act. Id.
at 577.
144. Id. at 564.
145. See infra Part IV.
146. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
147. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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will discuss, the Eighth Circuit, applying the Supreme Court’s
decision in White, invalidated a law that imposed restrictions on
judges similar to those imposed by the Hatch Act.
2. The Supreme Court Has Made It Clear That Judges Are Fully
Protected in Their Exercise of Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has been highly skeptical of efforts to
restrict the rights of judges. In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, the Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota judicial canon
that forbade a judge from “announc[ing] his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues.” 148 Minnesota had a separate
provision that forbade judges from making “pledges or promises” as
to how they would decide a specific case before the court. 149 Thus,
the Minnesota statute dealt with positional conflicts and the
appearance of partiality that would arise from a judge announcing his
views on a contested issue. The Court concluded that while
impartiality in the sense of a “lack of bias for or against either party
to the proceeding” was essential for due process, the clause was “not
narrowly tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of
impartiality) in this sense.” 150 Indeed, because the clause did not
“restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for
or against particular issues,” it was “barely tailored to serve that
interest at all.” 151 The Court explained that “lack of preconception
in favor of or against a particular legal view” is “not
a compelling state interest, as strict scrutiny requires.” 152 “A judge’s
lack of predisposition” was not “a necessary component of equal
justice” and in fact “would be evidence of lack of qualification, not
lack of bias.” 153 Nor could creating the appearance of that type of
impartiality be considered compelling.
One lingering question that remained after the White decision
was the proper standard of review for laws that impinge upon judicial
148. 536 U.S. at 768.
149. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002); see also White,
536 U.S. at 812–13.
150. White, 536 U.S. at 775–76.
151. Id. at 776.
152. Id. at 777.
153. Id. at 777–78.
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free speech or other fundamental rights. The majority opinion clearly
applied strict scrutiny, but Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, while
agreeing that “[t]here is authority for the Court to apply strict
scrutiny,” undertook a different analysis that focused on the contentbased nature of the restrictions. 154 Kennedy also left open the
question of “whether the rationale of Pickering . . . and Connick . . .
could be extended to allow a general speech restriction on sitting
judges.” 155 Because Justice Kennedy was the critical fifth vote,
circuits have split as to how to apply the White decision. 156 Some
apply strict scrutiny, while others apply the Pickering balancing
test. 157
However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee
v. Florida Bar seems to decisively resolve this question in favor of
strict scrutiny. In that opinion concerning restrictions on judicial
fundraising, Chief Justice Roberts in his majority opinion clearly
applied strict scrutiny. 158 While two of the Justices in the majority
indicated that they would not apply strict scrutiny, all four dissenting
judges applied strict scrutiny. 159 There is now therefore a clear 7-2

154. Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 796.
156. See Ashna Zaheer, Judging Judges: Why Strict Scrutiny Resolves the Circuit Split over
Judicial Speech Restrictions, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 882 (2011).
157. See id. Another rather unsatisfying possibility is that a different standard might
apply to appointed and elected officials. This standard would be especially problematic in a
state like California that employs a hybrid system. It would mean that elected judges at trial
courts can be members of the Scouts while appointed judges such as state appellate or supreme
court judges would not. Such a standard also is difficult to apply in states like Utah where
judges are appointed by the Governor but then subject to retention elections. See id. at 906
(arguing that “in the case of elected judges, while the government is technically the employer,
the judge ultimately is accountable to the people”). Zaheer makes compelling arguments that
strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review because the expressive activity involved is
frequently core political speech touching on matters of great public concern and such bans are
often not content neutral. Zaheer argues that as a result of these conditions strict scrutiny
should be triggered. Both of these factors are also present with the Boy Scout ban:
Membership touches on matters of great public concern such as the degree to which the law
should prohibit discrimination against homosexuals, and the Boy Scout ban is not content or
viewpoint neutral because it allows membership in gay rights groups but not in a group such as
the Boy Scouts with a more conservative viewpoint. See generally id.
158. See infra Section III.B. for an extensive discussion of Williams-Yulee.
159. It has been noted that the application of strict scrutiny by the majority was
incredibly lax, especially in regard to the tailoring prongs. Nevertheless, this opinion clearly
establishes that strict scrutiny is the proper standard. As will be shown in Part IV, the tailoring
of the Boy Scout ban is far more egregious than that in the Williams-Yulee case. See Floyd
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majority in favor of the application of strict scrutiny, at least when
judicial speech rights are implicated. 160
The Court’s conclusion in White directly implicates the Scout
ban. Indeed, on remand after the Supreme Court’s decision in
White, the Eighth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s ruling to
invalidate a ban on partisan political activities on the part of judges.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the ban on group membership
was meant “to keep judges from aligning with particular views on
issues by keeping them from aligning with a particular political
party” and was therefore constitutionally suspect. 161 The court
reasoned that the argument “that associating with a particular
group will destroy a judge’s impartiality-differs only in form from
that which purportedly supports the announce clause-that expressing
one’s self on particular issues will destroy a judge’s impartiality”—the
very argument the Supreme Court had rejected in White. 162 The
court therefore applied traditional strict scrutiny and found that the
law violated the judge’s right to freedom of association. In rejecting
the State’s purported interest, moreover, the court rejected the
notion that mere membership in a political party could create bias
and explained that “any credible claim of bias would have to flow
from something more than the bare fact that the judge had
associated with” a partisan organization. 163
Abrams, Symposium: When Strict Scrutiny Ceased to be Strict, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2015,
9:47 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/symposium-when-strict-scrutiny-ceasedto-be-strict/ (“But the scrutiny actually provided by the majority to the Florida Code
provision was anything but strict. Justice Samuel Alito rightly concluded that the rule at issue
was ‘about as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.’”).
160. Chief Justice Roberts, in dicta, briefly suggested that freedom of association might
be treated differently when he emphasized that the less stringent standard of Buckley v. Valeo
applied because that case was about “freedom of political association.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla.
Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1976) (per
curiam)). However, Justice Roberts here is attempting to distinguish Buckley from the total
solicitation ban in Williams-Yulee and it is obvious that freedom of speech and association are
closely related rights. As mentioned in Section II.A., freedom of association claims traditionally
trigger strict scrutiny and this opinion provides no reason to treat the rights of judges
differently. Moreover, other rights implicated such as free exercise and parental autonomy
clearly trigger strict scrutiny. As such, this article will proceed with the assumption that strict
scrutiny is the proper standard when the associative, religious, and parental rights of judges are
implicated just as it is for speech rights.
161. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 754 (8th Cir. 2005).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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White and the subsequent Eighth Circuit opinion, as well as
Williams-Yulee, stand strongly for the principle that judges are
entitled to exercise their constitutional rights free from interference
by the State and make it clear that laws that burden the expressive
and associative rights of judges will be subject to searching scrutiny.
III. AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL IMPROPRIETY IS
NOT A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
As the preceding section shows, the Boy Scout ban impacts
multiple fundamental rights, any of which would be sufficient to
require strict scrutiny. Even though judges are public officers, that
fact does not reduce the State’s burden of justification. Thus, to
justify its ban, California would need to offer a compelling interest of
the highest magnitude and also show that its policy is as narrowly
tailored as possible to meet its compelling interest. 164
The chief interest advanced by the California Supreme Court in
its rulemaking was avoiding “the appearance of impropriety,” which
in its view “diminishe[s] public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.” 165 While it is generally not controversial
that avoiding judicial impropriety in specific cases is a compelling state
interest, it is not settled whether a more generalized fear of the
appearance of impropriety qualifies as a compelling governmental
interest. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent campaign
finance decisions suggest a great skepticism on the Court’s part of
arguments based on general appearances of impropriety or
corruption. 166 In that context, the Court has held that only
preventing quid pro quo corruption can be a compelling interest.
This suggests that preventing a generalized appearance of
164. As Justice Breyer pointed out in oral arguments for the Williams-Yulee case, which
will be discussed in detail in the following section, the Court has never expressly used the
wording “strict scrutiny” in cases regarding judicial speech. It has, however, suggested a very
heightened standard of review.
165. See supra Part I.
166. I am not the only one to draw a connection between Dale and the Court’s
campaign finance decisions. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and
Association Rights After Knox v. Seiu, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013)
(discussing Dale and Citizens United, and their impact on mandatory union dues); Mark D.
Bauer, Freedom of Association for College Fraternities After Christian Legal Society and Citizens
United, 39 J.C. & U.L. 247, 299 (2013) (considering how Citizens United might impact the
Court’s decision in Christian Legal Society).
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impropriety, as opposed to impropriety or bias in specific cases, does
not constitute a compelling governmental interest. Although the
Supreme Court’s recent Williams-Yulee opinion suggests that it will
provide greater latitude to the State in its efforts to prevent the
appearance of judicial impropriety, these decisions taken as a whole
still suggest that a mere abstract and generalized appearance of
impropriety will not be sufficient.
A. The Court’s Campaign Finance Decisions Show That Avoiding the
Appearance of Impropriety Is Not a Compelling Interest
While the connection between campaign finance and the rights
burdened by the Scout Ban may seem oblique, the U.S. Supreme
Court has made this connection explicit, at least as to the freedom of
association. In Buckley v. Valeo itself, for example, the Court
acknowledged that finance restrictions “impinge on protected
associational freedoms.” 167 More recently, in McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission, the Court suggested that aggregate donation
limits restrict a potential donor’s ability “to exercise his expressive
and associational rights.” 168 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has
always been suspicious of campaign finance reform laws, it has in
recent years increasingly struck down laws that the Government has
attempted to justify on the basis of avoiding a generalized
appearance of impropriety or corruption.
The Court’s approach to this issue has evolved substantially since
Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Court first considered a constitutional
challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act. 169 In that decision,
the Court upheld a wide range of campaign finance measures,
including a cap on the amount of donations that can be given to any
single candidate in a given year. In doing so, the Court held that
“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” is a
“constitutionally sufficient justification” for the limits. 170 The Court
stated that “the impact of the appearance of corruption” was “[o]f
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo

167.
168.
169.
170.
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arrangements.” 171 In response to the overbreadth challenge brought
by those opposing the limit, the Court explained that Congress was
justified “in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety.” 172
Indeed, the Buckley Court even accepted a congressional interest in
“the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election
process” as an important state interest. 173
Since Buckley, however, the Supreme Court has gradually
undermined the basis of that decision. In Citizens United v. FEC, the
Court struck down a prohibition on electioneering activities during a
campaign by corporations and unions. 174 In doing so, the Court
emphasized that, while “the potential for quid pro quo corruption”
justified limits on direct contributions to candidates, it could not
justify a limit on independent campaign related expenditures.175
While the Court paid some lip service to the prevention of the
appearance of corruption, it is clear that the Court was skeptical of
general efforts to simply create the appearance of fairness. Indeed,
the Court emphasized that “[r]eliance on a ‘generic favoritism or
influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment
analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no
limiting principle.’” 176
The Court’s more recent McCutcheon v. FEC decision is even
more explicit in the limits it places on campaign finance
restrictions. 177 There the Court struck down aggregate spending
limits that curtailed donations to candidates and political
party committees.
While the dissent emphasized that these laws serve “the public’s
interest” in ensuring a more representative and fair government,178
the majority rejected any effort to “define the boundaries of the First
Amendment by reference to such a generalized conception of the
public good.” 179 The Court made clear that “preventing corruption

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 25–27.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 78.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 345.
Id. at 359.
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014).
Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1449 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion).
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or the appearance of corruption” is the only legitimate governmental
interest for restricting campaign contributions. 180 And the
McCutcheon Court went even further, emphasizing that “Congress
may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’
corruption.’” 181 Simply limiting “the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” was
not sufficient. 182 Nor was the mere possibility that large expenditures
may lead to “‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political
parties.” 183 Likewise, the Court emphasized that “the Government’s
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally
confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.”184
Accordingly, limiting “the appearance of mere influence or access”
is insufficient. 185
The Court also rejected the government’s argument “that there
is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large check is given to a
legislator.” 186 It held instead that only contributions made by an
individual or group to a specific legislator can be said to cause quid
pro quo corruption. 187 The “basic nature of the party system,” the
Court said, “in which [individuals] join together to further common
political beliefs,” creates feelings of “particular gratitude,” but such
feelings of “shared interest” are not preventable. 188 Labeling them as
“quid pro quo corruption would dramatically expand government
regulation of the political process” and be invalid. 189 Indeed, such
feelings of “particular gratitude” and “shared interest” are inherent
in the democratic process and are not indicia of the existence of quid
pro quo corruption. 190

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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Thus, while the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he Government has a
strong interest . . . in combatting corruption and its appearance,”
that interest had to “be limited to a specific kind of corruption.”191
Only direct efforts to influence the decision making of legislator
qualified. Neither general feelings of gratitude caused by common
associational interests, nor the mere sense of special access, could
justify limits on expressive and associational freedoms. 192
B. While Williams-Yulee Suggests That the Court Is More Willing to
Find a Compelling Interest in the Judicial Context, It Remains
Unlikely to Find a Compelling Interest Absent a Likelihood of Quid
Pro Quo Corruption
This year, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld a
provision of the Florida Supreme Court’s Code of Judicial Conduct
that restricts judges from engaging in direct solicitation of funds for
their judicial campaigns. 193 Although parties argued extensively based
on Citizens United and McCutcheon, the Court dismissed these
comparisons and explained that “a State’s interest in preserving
public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and
executive elections.” 194 The Court also emphasized that “[s]tates
may regulate judicial elections differently than they regulate political
elections, because the role of judges differs from the role of
politicians.” 195 The Court even went so far as to say that “our
precedents applying the First Amendment to political elections have
little bearing on the issues here.” 196
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to apply its campaign finance
decisions directly in the judicial context, the Court went to great
lengths to emphasize the concrete nature of the impropriety that the
State was combatting. Unlike the Scout Ban, the policy in Florida
was specifically focused on quid pro quo corruption, 197 and the
191. Id. at 1462.
192. Id.
193. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
194. Id. at 1667.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499)
(“There are three interests. One, the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. One
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Florida Bar explained the purpose of the canon as “to prevent the
appearance of quid pro quo, bias or corruption, and to preserve the
integrity of our judiciary and maintain the public’s confidence in an
impartial judiciary.” 198 A judge that gets a donation from an
individual who frequently appears before the Court will readily
create the appearance of a direct conflict of interest or judicial
corruption in a way that mere group membership cannot. It was thus
reasonable for the State to conclude that “the public may lack
confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or
favor if he comes to office by asking for favors.” 199 As the Court
explained, “it is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that
judges who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity,”
which justifies the restriction. 200
The majority also emphasized the coercive and corrupting
influence of direct judicial solicitations: It pointed out that those
solicited will personally fear retaliation from the judge if they do not
donate and that potential litigants will be forced to select attorneys
based on who has made the requested donations. 201 Indeed, the
Court elsewhere has made clear that individual litigants have a due
process right against the “probability of actual bias” caused by an
opposing party’s financial support to a judge. 202 Accordingly, the
Florida restriction sought to target not the mere suggestion of
partiality, but the influence of coercive requests for donations on the
judicial process. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurrence,

[sic], the interest in promoting impartiality/preventing bias. And third, the interest in
protecting persons solicited against coercion.”).
198. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/13-1499-ts-1.pdf (quoting
Amended Answer Brief at 8, Fla. Bar v Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (Fla 2014), aff’d, 135
S. Ct. 1656 (No. SC11-265), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2011/201400/11-265_AnsBrief.pdf); see also Fla. Bar, 138 So. 3d at 385 (Fla. 2014) (“Therefore, in
light of this Court’s prior holding that Florida has a compelling interest in protecting the
integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary—a
holding that is bolstered by the broad acceptance of comparable compelling State interests by
other state supreme courts—we conclude that Canon 7C(1), which furthers these goals, serves
compelling State interests.”).
199. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666.
200. Id. at 1667.
201. Id. at 1667–68.
202. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877–78, 884 (2009).
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“[d]isproportionate spending to influence court judgments threatens
both the appearance and actuality of judicial independence.” 203
Ultimately, the danger caused by judges’ direct solicitation
closely mirrors the danger caused by donations that raised the
specter of quid pro quo corruption. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy
pointed out in McConnell, “[t]he quid pro quo nature of candidate
contributions justified the conclusion that the contributions pose
inherent corruption potential; and this in turn justified the
conclusion that their regulation would stem the appearance of
real corruption.” 204
In short, while the Supreme Court seems more broadly
supportive of efforts to combat the appearance of partiality in the
judicial context because of the distinctive role of judges, 205 the
Williams-Yulee decision should not be seen as a complete embrace of
all efforts to root out the appearance of partiality in the judiciary.
The narrowness of the decision also suggests that a policy such as the
Scout ban, which is less closely rooted in efforts “to prevent a
concrete as opposed to speculative harm,” 206 would be treated less
favorably by the Court. 207

203. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1675 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
relied on studies that that “the money pressure groups spend on judicial elections ‘can affect
judicial decision-making across a broad range of cases.’” Id. (quoting Brief of Professors of
Law, Economics, and Political Science as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14,
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499)) (citing Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang,
SKEWED JUST. (2014), http://skewedjustice.org).
204. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 298 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
205. Joseph
Grodin, Symposium:
The
Distinctive
Character
of
Judging,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/
symposium-the-distinctive-character-of-judging/.
206. Brief for The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/Brief
sV4/13-1499_amicus_JeffersonCenter.authcheckdam.pdf.
207. It is illustrative to contrast Chief Justice Roberts’s more restrained majority opinion
with Justice Ginsburg’s broad concurrence. Justice Ginsburg wrote “separately to reiterate the
substantial latitude, in my view, States should possess to enact campaign-finance rules geared to
judicial elections.” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Roberts, in contrast, emphasized that his opinion does not touch on “a slew of broader
questions” such as whether judicial campaign spending can be capped. Id. at 1672 (majority
opinion). Chief Justice Roberts thus makes it clear that his opinion applies only to the narrow
set of circumstances implicated by direct judicial solicitation of funds. Id.; see also Jessica Ring
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C. The Scout Ban Does Not Further a Compelling
Governmental Interest
While the Williams-Yulee opinion cautions against mechanically
importing campaign finance logic into the judicial realm, the fact
that California’s rationale falls so far outside of what the Court has
accepted as a compelling interest suggests that, for this reason alone,
the Scout ban should fail strict scrutiny.
Just as only the appearance of quid pro quo corruption could
justify restrictions on campaign finance donations, judicial codes of
ethics should only be permitted to forbid a specific type of action in
which an undue influence creates the perception that a judge is
incapable of rendering an impartial or unbiased decision in a specific
case. This was precisely the case with the direct solicitation in
Williams-Yulee. In contrast, a general sense that a judge, through
group membership, is more inclined towards a certain worldview
should be deemed insufficient. As with membership in political
parties and affiliation with political interest groups, judges are
invariably influenced by ideology, association, and life experience.
Attempting to isolate or prevent any sense of “shared interest”
between members of the judiciary and the outside world would
“dramatically
expand
government
regulation”
to
208
impermissible levels.
As with elected officials, judges generally are given a wide degree
of discretion and trust by society. As with those we elect, “public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime” of
judicial discretion invariably creates some appearance of the potential
for impropriety. 209 Yet judges are presumed capable of putting aside
individual feelings about certain issues in order to render an
impartial and just verdict. Just as it may be unrealistic to expect the
legislator always to legislate for the common good rather than for
personal interests, so too might it be unrealistic to expect a judge
always to be impartial despite personal feelings. But both of these
expectations are essential for the functioning of a democratic society.

Amunson, Symposium: A Rare Case Indeed, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:15 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/symposium-a-rare-case-indeed/.
208. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014).
209. See id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)).
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Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, allowing judges to be
opinionated about issues and to participate in their community is
actually a boon and does not undermine trust in the judiciary.
Because of the important role that judges play, it is “all the more
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on
matters of current public importance.” 210 Joining expressive
associations such as the Boy Scouts is one way for a judge to express
herself on a matter of great public importance. Membership in the
Scouts also has other benefits such as community involvement and
ensuring that judges interact with a variety of citizens. 211 The Model
Code of Judicial Conduct also seems to recognize that the general
benefits of judicial involvement in the community substantially
outweigh any partiality that a judge may acquire through “shared
interest” with certain groups. 212
The fact that California seeks to restrict membership in only
particular groups thus reveals that the State’s interest is not based on
the existence of actual partiality or bias, which could constitute a
compelling interest. Membership in permitted groups may just as
strongly influence a judge’s worldview or ideology. For instance, a
judge that is a member of a Humanist Society may feel strong
antipathy toward religious plaintiffs. Likewise, a Jewish judge may
feel great sympathy for a coreligionist plaintiff. On the other hand,
members of groups are not monolithic and may disagree with certain
policies and positions taken by that group while still remaining
members. If a state truly has a compelling interest, it cannot be
enforced haphazardly or selectively. 213 As the Court emphasized in
210. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002) (quoting Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)).
211. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and
Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 53 (2014) (arguing
that freedom of association has independent value in enhancing “civic and political
engagement,” and civic society).
212. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2007) (“Participation in both law-related and other extrajudicial activities helps integrate
judges into their communities, and furthers public understanding of and respect for courts and
the judicial system.”). As Professor Feldman has noted, “[a]nd how important is it, really, for
judges to be treated as secular monks, cut off from certain disfavored forms of social contact to
convince the public that they are pure and holy?” Feldman, supra note 5.
213. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (noting that even
categories of wholly unprotected speech cannot “be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content”).
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Williams-Yulee, “[u]nderinclusiveness can also reveal that a law does
not actually advance a compelling interest.” 214 By seeking to
selectively enforce a group membership ban, the State thus admits
that group membership is not sufficient to create actual partiality.
Instead, the ban is motivated (at best) by the same illegitimate
concern for the appearance of partiality or bias which the Court
rejected in Citizen’s United and McCutcheon.
Moreover, the State’s interest cannot be said to be compelling
because it is based on pure conjecture that membership in the Scouts
creates an appearance of partiality. There is no proof that the
appearance of judicial partiality as a result of group membership is
actually a problem of sufficient magnitude to justify the State’s
restriction. As several judges on the San Diego Superior Court noted
in their comment on the proposed change:
Notably, the Committee does not cite a single survey, a single
complaint about the impartiality of any judge, or even a bare
anecdote in support of its “view” and “agreement.” It offers no
empirical evidence of any kind, much less any substantial evidence
that would justify the impact of the Proposal on the private lives
of judges. 215

Absent any sort of finding that membership in groups such as the
Boy Scouts actually raises concerns about the appearance of
partiality, much less actual partiality, the radical step of banning
membership cannot be justified. Even if the State’s interest is
compelling in theory, 216 it simply has not laid the factual foundation
to justify burdening the rights of judges. 217

214. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015).
215. AMENDMENT COMMENTARY, supra note 25, cmt. 516 at 231 (comment of Hon.
Julia Kelety et al.).
216. Under strict scrutiny, it is not enough for a governmental justification to be
theoretically compelling at a high level of generality. Instead, a court must “carefully examine[]
the interest asserted by the government.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
228 (1995).
217. By contrast, as to non-expressive groups such as the Jaycees, the State might be able
to argue under the Jaycees opinion that its interests trump because of the less substantial
burden on freedom of association. Yet, even in the Jaycees case, the Court still applied strict
scrutiny. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. Moreover, it also seems that the
State’s interest in combating discrimination is weaker when it only restricts judges from
membership while allowing the group to continue to engage in what it considers invidious
discrimination. Given that the State’s interest in reducing the appearance of generalized
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Ultimately, the rationale underlying the Scout ban is more similar
to that which the Court rejected in White than that which it
embraced in Williams-Yulee. California has not suggested that
judges’ mere membership in groups such as the Boy Scouts will
impact their judicial decision-making and lead them to be biased
towards or against particular litigants. The possibility of such an
effect as this was central to the Court’s reasoning in Williams-Yulee.
In contrast, just like the restriction on judicial speech that the Court
rejected in White, the Scout ban seeks to curtail the appearance that
judges have prejudged or decided issues before they reach the Court.
Yet, while there is good reason to suspect that money will have a
powerful and subversive impact on the administration of justice,
California has not explained how mere membership in groups such
as the Scouts will in any way bias the administration of justice.
California’s interest is therefore not compelling.
IV. EVEN IF THE STATE’S INTEREST IS COMPELLING, THE SCOUT
BAN IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE THAT INTEREST
The selective and haphazard nature of the ban also reveals how
poorly fitted the law is to achieving the State’s purported interests.
Thus, even if the ban could be justified as an effort to reduce the
appearance of partiality, it should still be invalidated under the
second prong of strict scrutiny analysis. This section will first look at
the lack of narrow tailoring and then consider the abundance of less
restrictive alternatives that the State could employ.
A. The California Scout Ban Is Not Narrowly Tailored Because It Is
Severely Under- and Overinclusive
One of the major problems with the California policy is its gross
underinclusiveness.
While
there
is
“no
freestanding
‘underinclusiveness limitation,’” 218 as the Supreme Court explained
in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, an ordinance that is underinclusive is
especially problematic when it represents “a governmental attempt to
give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in

impropriety is not compelling, it seems hard to justify a restriction solely on
judicial membership.
218. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387).
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expressing its views to the people,” or involves the State seeking to
“control . . . the search for political truth.” 219 Moreover, as the Court
explained in Ladue, the existence of a wide range of exemptions can
“diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting
speech in the first place.” 220 With the California policy, the
Government is banning membership in groups that are critical of
homosexual conduct, while not restricting membership in advocacy
groups that advocate for greater inclusion of sexual minorities. A
judge could therefore be affiliated with the Gay and Lesbian Alliance
Against Discrimination (GLAAD) or the Human Rights Campaign
but not with the Boy Scouts of America. 221 Thus, unlike the canon
that the Court upheld in Williams-Yulee, the Scout ban does not
apply “evenhandedly to all judges and judicial candidates, regardless
of [their] viewpoint.” 222
Of course, it can be argued that the distinction is based not on
the viewpoint of the group but on the choice to engage in what the
State considers invidious discrimination. Yet this argument runs afoul
of the Court’s reasoning in the Dale case: There are times when the
act of discriminating in regard to membership is an essential part of
the expressive message of a group. 223 By limiting membership in
groups that express views critical of homosexual conduct and that act
upon that message by restricting membership, the State of California
is giving “one side of a debatable public question an advantage in
expressing its views to the people.” The policy also seeks to
“control . . . the search for political truth” as it labels as unqualified
those judges who wish to support the expressive message of
the Scouts. 224
This viewpoint discrimination effectively undermines the State’s
asserted interest even if that interest can be seen as compelling. If the
State truly wanted to avoid all appearance of general partiality or
bias, it would ban membership in all advocacy and expressive

219. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)).
220. Id. at 52.
221. Accord Grindlay, supra note 5, at 576 (“The Rule is also underinclusive in its
one-sidedness.”).
222. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 at 1668.
223. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
224. Ladue, 512 U.S. at 51.
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groups—or at least those with a view about homosexual conduct. 225
After all, if mere membership in a group is sufficient to create a bias,
then religious plaintiffs should be concerned if their judge is a
member of a group often hostile to religion—such as a Humanist
group or a gay rights group. Instead, the State is favoring
membership of groups that advocate a certain viewpoint concerning
the treatment of sexual minorities and disfavoring other viewpoints.
The State’s concern for partiality is revealed as a façade because it is
severely underinclusive.
As Justice Scalia has noted, “[A] law cannot be regarded as
protecting an interest of the highest order . . . when it leaves
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”226
By continuing to allow judges to participate in organizations that
engage in issue advocacy, but not advocacy groups that have
exclusive membership practices, the State still “leaves appreciable
damage to [its] supposedly vital interest” in avoiding the appearance
of bias “unprohibited.” 227 For instance, a judge could openly be a
member of a group that strongly advocates against gay rights while
still remaining on the judiciary. Indeed, nothing would stop that
judge from deciding a case that involves questions of gay rights, just
as nothing prevented openly gay Judge Walker from reviewing
California’s Proposition 8. 228 Thus, absent evidence that membership
in groups that have discriminatory membership practices is so much
more harmful to the appearance of partiality, the rule should be
invalidated for its extreme under-inclusion.

225. Accord Grindlay, supra note 5, at 574 (“The Rule is also underinclusive with respect
to that interest since the Rule goes only so far as to prohibit judges from belonging to
organizations that practice ‘invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.’ It does not prohibit membership in groups
that discriminate on other bases, such as disability, wealth, veteran status, ideology,
intelligence, or physical attractiveness. If a judge’s membership in an exclusionary organization
entails bias toward those excluded, then judges should also be prohibited from
membership . . . .”) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
226. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (Scalia J., concurring)
(quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989)); see also Ladue, 512 U.S. at 52
(stating that such under-inclusion can “diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale
for restricting speech in the first place”).
227. White, 536 U.S. at 780 (Scalia J., concurring).
228. Jennifer Epstein, Gay-Marriage Foes: Judge was Biased, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2011,
6:52 AM EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53703.html.
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The Scout ban is also severely overinclusive. Specifically, the ban
imposes a broad stereotype on all members of a group simply based
on group membership. 229 But furthering the assumption that all
members of the Boy Scouts are biased against sexual minorities “may
come at the sacrifice of the long-term enhancement of the judicial
system’s appearance of impartiality.” 230 Many members of the Boy
Scouts disagree with the current policies and procedures and seek to
change them. 231 Many others likely agree with the policies and yet
would impartially decide a case brought by a member of the GLBTQ
community and show great sympathy to such individuals. By
stereotyping and prejudicing based on group membership, the
California Supreme Court is sending the message that judges are
simply creatures of bias who impose their personal views in the
courtroom. 232 By selectively imposing a ban on membership only in
groups that are critical of homosexuals, the court is also leading to
cynicism and a sense that the judicial system is biased in favor of
certain interests. That, too, undermines the stated interest in the
appearance of impartiality.
B. The California Scout Ban Is Not Narrowly Tailored Because There
Are Far Less Restrictive Alternatives
Several less restrictive alternatives to the Scout ban also exist. For
example, requiring judicial disclosure of group membership is clearly

229. See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance
and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 627 (2004) (arguing that profiling
individuals based on their belonging in a certain group is deeply problematic).
230. Michelle L. Jones, Note, Religiously Devout Judges: A Decision-Making Framework
for Judicial Disqualification, 88 IND. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2013).
231. The Judicial Council for the Sixth Circuit grappled with this question when it
considered whether a judge’s membership in a discriminatory golf club violated the Judicial
Code of Ethics even though the judge had made efforts to get the club to change its
membership practices. In a closely divided 10-8 decision, the Council concluded that the
judge’s efforts “precluded a finding” that the canon was violated. See Phillips, supra note 15,
at 734.
232. See Grindlay, supra note 5, at 581 (“Public confidence in the judiciary certainly has
suffered in recent years, but this is hardly due to judges’ membership in groups like the Boy
Scouts. On the contrary, public confidence in the judiciary has decreased in large part because
of the perception that judges have departed from their constitutionally prescribed role and
have become beholden to certain ideologies.”).
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permissible and less restrictive. 233 In the case of In re Anastaplo, the
Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Illinois bar to deny
admission to an individual who refused to answer questions
regarding his Communist Party affiliation. 234 The Court concluded
that it is not “constitutionally impermissible” to ask those seeking
admission to the bar questions about their group membership and
affiliation. 235 States are also free to adopt “recusal standards more
rigorous than due process requires,” and to “censure judges who
violate these standards.” 236
Professor Geyh draws a distinction between ethical and
procedural restrictions that might also be helpful in considering less
restrictive options: Procedural restrictions such as requiring recusal
are seen as less burdensome than those that impose ethical
obligations on judges. 237 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems far more
willing to allow for disqualification of judges in particular cases than
punishment of judges attempting to exercise First Amendment
rights. 238 Judges can also be more fully circumscribed in their incourt speech and perhaps greater limitations could be placed on the
display of symbols of group membership, such as the Scout insignia,

233. See id. at 574, 582; Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Correctness Meets Constitutional
Correctness: Section 2C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1293,
1293 (2004).
234. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
235. Id. at 88.
236. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
While the Court in Williams-Yulee rejected recusal as a less restrictive alternative, it did so
because of the immense burden that this would impose on the court system: “A rule requiring
judges to recuse themselves from every case in which a lawyer or litigant made a campaign
contribution would disable many jurisdictions.” See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct.
1656, 1671 (2015). In contrast, there is no reason to think that asking judges to recuse
themselves from cases when their membership in a group would create direct bias would
unduly burden the judicial system.
237. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV.
493, 528 (2013) (noting that “it may be problematic under the First Amendment to
reprimand a judge for making statements to the detriment of her perceived impartiality, but
not to disqualify her from a case for doing so”).
238. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (concluding
that Due Process requires recusal in cases where “the probability of actual bias on the part of
the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable” (quoting Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))); see also Keith Swisher, Recusal, Government Ethics, and
Superannuated Constitutional Theory, 72 MD. L. REV. 219, 228 (2012); James Sample,
Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 298 (2010).
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that would make those standing before the judge feel as though the
judge is biased against them. 239
Another significant concern with the Scout ban is that it
unsettles judges’ expectations. When the State enacted the restriction
on membership in groups that practice sexual orientation
discrimination, it also enacted an exception for membership in youth
groups such as the Boy Scouts. Many judges presumably joined the
Boy Scouts and had their children participate under the expectation
that the State “would not penalize them, directly or indirectly, for
doing so thereafter.” 240 At the very least, therefore, the State should
not be able to retroactively impose punishment on judges that are
already members of the Boy Scouts. 241 A ban on new judges would
still be unconstitutional, but the possibility of only a prospective ban
shows that the existing law is far from the least restrictive alternative.
Another alternative, as Feldman notes, is in the judicial selection
process. 242 In many states, voters directly elect judges and can choose
those who do not belong to organizations such as the Boy Scouts.
Likewise, as a result of social pressure, a President or Governor
might become more reluctant to appoint judges that are active
members of groups like the Scouts. Additionally, judges may
voluntarily choose to limit or curtail involvement in groups such as
the Scouts if in their judgment such an action is necessary to create
greater community trust.
Yet another possibility is that the determination of whether a
group participates in invidious discrimination is left up to the
individual judge and is not enforceable as a cause for removing a

239. See Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV.
687, 687 (1997). See generally Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the Right to an
Impartial Adjudicator, 30 REV. LITIG. 849, 864 (2011) (discussing limitations on attorney
speech in a court room setting).
240. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 268 (1957).
241. While it of course is possible for a judge to cease membership in order to escape
punishment, forcing a judge to decide between exercising his religious, expressive, and parental
rights, or losing his livelihood is especially problematic.
242. Feldman, supra note 5 (“Then we wouldn’t be able to rely on the canons of judicial
conduct to create the appearance of fairness. We would have to rely instead on vigilance and
common sense, and choose judges who are actually fair and actually don’t discriminate. Which
doesn’t sound so bad after all.”).
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judge from service. 243 For instance, the commentary to the Arkansas
Judicial code states that “[u]ltimately, each judge must determine in
the judge’s own conscience whether participation in such an
organization violates [the rule].” 244 This approach would encourage
judges to self-regulate and avoid membership in organizations that
would send the wrong message to litigants without infringing on
constitutionally protected rights. 245
Alternatively, the State could enforce the ban on membership in
groups that engage in invidious discrimination only in cases where
the facts “clearly and convincingly lead to the conclusion that the
words and actions call into question the integrity and impartiality of
the judge.” 246 The Washington Supreme Court for instance
overturned sanctions against a judge who attended and spoke at an
anti-abortion rally. 247 The Court concluded that “the strict scrutiny
required” could only be satisfied with specific evidence that would
justify construing the remarks “as an express or implied promise to
decide particular issues in a particular way.” 248 Under the standard
employed by the Washington Supreme Court, only a situation where
membership in a group created “an express or implied promise to
decide particular issues in a particular way” could justify excluding
one from sitting on the bench, rather than simply general group

243. The Oral Advice summary of November 2015 seems to hint at this approach
without fully embracing it. It suggests that judges are ultimately responsible for determining
whether a group practices invidious discrimination. Yet, it also does not foreclose the
possibility of challenges and enforcement of the ban. Calif. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial
Ethics
Ops.,
Oral
Advice
Summary
No.
2015-014
(Nov.
12,
2015),
http://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/sites/default/files/CJEO%20Oral%20Advice%20Su
mmary%202015-014.pdf.
244. ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 r. 3.6 AFFILIATION WITH
DISCRIMINATORY ORGANIZATIONS cmt. [2A] (2014), https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-andadministrative-orders/court-rules/rule-36-affiliation-discriminatory-organizations.
245. By inviting comments specifically on a ban of membership in the Boy Scouts of
America, California took a stance and asserted that the Boy Scouts engaged in invidious
discrimination. Thus, were California to adopt the Arkansas approach it would probably need
to clarify that it is not taking a stance on whether or not the Boy Scouts engages in
invidious discrimination.
246. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 377 (Wash. 1998).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 376.
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membership. 249 Such a ban on group membership would likely
survive strict scrutiny because it deals with actual and specific
partiality rather than merely the appearance of partiality that results
from group membership. 250 If California wants to keep and actively
enforce a ban on group membership, this seems like the least
restrictive and most likely constitutional alternative.
V. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in In re Anastaplo, Justice Black powerfully spoke
of a tendency in the bar which also appears to underlie California’s
attempt to bar its judges from membership in the Boy Scouts:
To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, timeserving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade
it. . . . Too many men are being driven to become governmentfearing and time-serving because the Government is being
permitted to strike out at those who are fearless enough to think as
they please and say what they think. This trend must be halted if
we are to keep faith with the Founders of our Nation and pass on
to future generations of Americans the great heritage of
freedom which they sacrificed so much to leave to us. 251

California’s decision is unfortunately yet another step towards
forcing out of public service individuals who disagree with the
consensus position on controversial social issues. Once, communist
membership was a badge of shame that barred membership from the
bar and other professions. Today in California, membership in an
organization that has produced at least four Presidents of the United
States 252 and a variety of other national leaders has become a new

249. Id. For instance, one could imagine that group which engages in invidious
discrimination and also has an oath of membership could be seen as binding on the judge to
decide a case in a certain way.
250. The Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference has likewise suggested that the code of
judicial ethics can best be seen as “general guidance” and must be applied on a case-by-case
basis. See Phillips, supra note 15, at 743.
251. 366 U.S. 82, 115–16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
252. President Barack Hussein Obama was a member of Gerakan Pramuka; an
Indonesian Scout Association roughly the equivalent of the Boy Scouts. If counted, he would
be the fifth President to be a Scout. Jimmy Carter was also a Scoutmaster as an adult. See 100
Things You Didn’t Know About Scouting, BOY SCOUTS AM.: NAT’L SCOUT JAMBOREE,
http://www.scouting.org/JamboreeMedia/100Things.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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sign of stigma and exclusion. As Justice Black urged, in order to
secure this nation’s “great heritage of freedom” and “keep faith with
the Founders of our Nation,” this trend towards exclusion and
ostracism “must be halted.” 253
California’s ban is inconsistent with that “great heritage of
freedom” because it stigmatizes, stereotypes, ostracizes and excludes
people from judicial service in violation of deeply held fundamental
rights of association, parental autonomy, and free exercise of religion.
California’s Scout ban—and similar bans that are likely to crop up in
other states—cannot be justified by a compelling interest and is
poorly tailored to achieve the State’s purpose. It should
be overturned.
Daniel Ortner*

253. Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 116 (Black, J., dissenting).
* J.D., April 2015, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I would like to
thank Professors Gene Schaerr, Fred Gedicks, and Michael W. McConnell for their assistance
and support in writing this Comment.
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